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1DEBT BURDEN REDUCTION, LENDING, CONCESSIONAL FINANCE: 
RELATIVE COST EFFECTIVENESS PERMUTATIONS AND COMBINATIONS
Reginald Herbold Green
On a cloth untrue 
With a twisted cue 
And elliptical billiard balls.
- Gilbert and Sullivan
1. No simple all country answer as to the appropriate degree o f external debt burden 
writedown (from 0 to 100%) is possible, still less any sweeping pronunciamento on its 
efficiency vis-a-vis lending and/or concessional finance. However, in virtually all cases 
in which writedown is appropriate it will be as part o f a combination of debt 
writedown, concessional finance and - probably - commercial lending. In that context 
debt writedown can allow more efficient use of concessional finance, less problematic 
(to lenders as well as borrowers) undertaking of new commercial loans and a less 
uncertain climate for external investment.
2. The most appropriate base for evaluating possible writedowns is debt burden: interest 
plus repayment at present discounted value and the temporal pattern of servicing 
obligations. Normally the best series to which to relate it is earned foreign exchange 
(i.e. import/debt service) capacity, i.e. visible and invisible exports (including tourism 
and worker remittances).
3. No absolute cut-off ratio o f debt service burden to earned foreign exchange is 
appropriate albeit it is reasonable to presume annual flow ratios below 10% are 
unlikely to justify writedowns and levels above 25% are very likely to do so. The 
import intensity o f the economy, the external finance intensity o f investment and the 
prospects for external earnings are significant in estimating debt service ratios 
consistent with sustainable growth and development at - say - 6% per annum.
4. One means to estimate needed writedown is to project over 10 years:
2a. GDP at 6% compound growth,
b. Import (visible and invisible) levels consistent with "a" on reasonable structural
assumptions;
c. Earned foreign exchange (visible and invisible exports plus net remittances) levels - 
on relatively conservative estimations;
d. External reserve increase requirements (say to 3 months external payments);
e. Net permanent external investment (excluding short term footloose financial 
capital and probably portfolio investment) computed as new investment less 
remitted profits plus repatriated capital;
f. Interest and repayment on new loans (commercial or concessional) projected as 
needed/taken up/received during the decade;
g. With (c + e) - (a + d + f) indicating manageable debt service burden levels on 
existing external debt stock year by year and for the decade.
This is not a particularly novel approach. It is very similar to that in World Bank 
evaluations o f acceptable/efficiency debt service levels. It does not necessarily imply 
any impropriety or mutual miscalculation in any or all o f the debt incurrance/extension 
nor, indeed, any philanthropic motives. It is, however, perfectly consistent with 
globalisation o f Adam Smith's basic moral economy premise and imperative that no 
nation be great and prosperous the majority of whose people were poor and miserable. 
The bottom line is that global macroeconomic and security (as much as humanitarian) 
interests are best served by debt service burdens compatible with 6% growth in 
poor/lower middle income economies and levels significantly above that are prima 
facie  candidates for writedown.
5. How a writedown is achieved is a secondary (if doubtless central in negotiating actual 
packages) issue so long as present value of debt service burden is reduced by an 
agreed proportion and a practicable time profile for that service achieved:
a. interest rate reductions, grace periods, extension of repayment period, additional 
concessional finance to service old loans 1 are all acceptable if they achieve (singly 
or together) the level and pattern needs
3b different proportions o f writedown (by class of credit, by country or institution, by 
particular characteristics of particular lending transactions) are all acceptable albeit 
differences among countries (as lenders or homes of commercial sector lenders) 
and among particular projects/loans are likely to pose severe negotiating 
difficulties in many cases.2
In respect to both "a" and "b" the divergences of interest are basically among lenders - 
the bottom line for the debtor is total writedown whatever instruments are used and 
however the cost o f those writedowns are divided among creditors.
6. Two contrasting problems arise in respect to debtors who are not servicing (and on 
reasonable projections can never be expected to service) significant proportions of 
their external debt and per contra those which have never had a substantial writedown, 
have re-entered the commercial borrowing market but have inefficiently high debt 
service burdens:
a. in the former case writedowns do not in fact free any present (or in some cases any 
substantial future) foreign exchange flows. What they do achieve is to create a 
climate o f greater certainty for states, domestic enterprises, external lenders and 
foreign investors alike by removing a debt overhang which might - at least in 
theory - come crashing down. In such cases it is clearly inefficient to accept 
writedowns which reduce present concessional finance inflows significantly or - 
even in return for substantial writedowns - provide for substantial actual debt 
service which would not otherwise take place unless the latter is fully or 
predominately offset by additional concessional or quasi concessional finance. On 
the face o f it, such "dead" debt overhang - e.g. enterprise commercial credit long in 
arrear and defaulted bank loans/guarantees should be subject to draconic 
writedowns - not least because enterprises (by above the going rate prices on later 
cash sales) and banks (by provisioning) usually have written them down or even 
off.
b. in the latter case special problems of division of writedown burden arise. To seek 
an across-the-board cut including commercial lenders could prejudice the 
sustainability o f access to new commercial loans. Whether bilateral official lenders 
would accept making up the whole writedown is problematic. Possibly 
concessional loans (e.g. by IDA?) to buy back some high interest/short maturity
4commercial debt plus partial writedown of bilateral loans through retrospective 
conversion to grants would be practicable. -1
7. Writedown of World Bank and IMF lendings/facilities is perfectly feasible 
commercially if desired politically.^ It can be achieved through at least three 
modalities (separately or jointly):
a. de facto  rolling over short/hard to long/soft facilities, e.g. ESAF for Higher Credit 
Tranche drawings; IDA credits for World Bank loans - as is being/has been done 
on a not insubstantial scale;
b. use o f profits from partial sales of gold reserves (IMF) and o f a portion o f profits 
(Fund and Bank) for writedowns (albeit in the Bank case this could reduce their 
use to bolster IDA credit availability);
c. bilateral funding o f a proportion of IMF/World Bank debt service - as already done 
in respect to arrears in several 'restart' packages (again with a risk o f at least partial 
substitution rather than additionality).
8. The argument that overhang reduction will do little (or negative) good if it simply 
allows new overhang build-up is valid but - assuming either lender or debtor prudence 
- is unlikely to apply to very many cases. ^  The cost - especially in Africa - of 
labouring under excess debt overhangs and the length o f the period before temporary 
relief - let alone substantial writedown - strongly incline prudent governments against 
new borrowing sprees and the recent historical record should also lead to greater 
concessional and commercial lender and donor prudence.
9. The argument over debt writedown or concessional finance or commercial lending is 
misplaced Carteseanism. At least two are likely to be prudent in almost all cases and 
all three outside a handful o f least developed countries with structurally and secularly 
poor foreign exchange earning prospects. The formula suggested would yield 75% to 
95% writedowns for a handful o f countries, e.g. Mozambique, Tanzania, Guinea- 
Bissau, Somalia's successor state(s), but each would self-evidently need continued 
access to concessional finance even though prudent (for borrower as well as lender) 
use o f commercial finance except via escrow account channelled protected export 
oriented projects) is likely to be quite limited.
510. In general it is likely to be more efficient to provide writedowns than to increase 
concessional finance for other purposes and, especially, than to raise commercial 
borrowing levels. One basic reason is fungibility. Tightly constrained finance - as to 
sources or to uses - is likely to have less impact than unconstrained. Earned foreign 
exchange freed from debt service is de facto (as well as de jure) totally untied. A 
second reason is certainty/predictability. Debt overhang writedown - once achieved - 
sets new parameters and has a reasonably projectible impact. This cannot be said of 
(readily reversible) increases in concessional or commercial lending flows. Therefore, 
it is likely - $ for $ - to have a position impact on public policy efficiency, business 
expectations and the "animal spirits of entrepreneurs".
11. To stand the previous point on its head and argue that external debt writedown 
reduces lender/donor leverage and thereby can be expected to reduce efficiency of 
resource use/quality o f public policy could be true but only under rather unrealistic 
assumptions. These go well beyond borrower imprudence (public and/or private) 
and/or corruption. (If both borrowers and lenders share these characteristics all 
resources will be inefficiently used in macro economic or human welfare terms, 
however sourced and whatever the nominal quasi public conditionalites.) It also 
requires that the economy after debt service writedowns either requires no capital 
account inflows or can find adequate footloose financial capital and/or foreign long 
term investment despite inappropriate policies. The former source can (vide Mexico 
and Pinochet Chile) work for a time but hardly indefinitely and logically can be 
prevented by IMF-Central Bank action with as well as without writedown. The 
second is rather unlikely with sound policies let alone with manifestly unsound. As to 
nil new external capital inflow requirements no low or lower middle income country 
has exhibited that is a sustained structural characteristic - Botswana did exhibit it for 
about a decade but appears to be the only case even for that long.
12. However, a caveat is needed. Substitution of actual concessional (let alone 
commercial) finance for otherwise unmet debt service is subtractional rather than 
additional and efficiency gains are rather unlikely to outweigh immediately usable 
resource volume losses. Further the usual context in which writedown is seriously 
discussed is one in which debt overhang and - perhaps - excessive actual debt service 
are preventing achieving adequate and sustainable growth levels despite substantial 
concessional finance and are also inhibiting external investment and either extending or 
accepting commercial loans. In such contexts at least some additionality (plus
6writedown of'dead' debt overhang 'lost' long ago but still on the books) is necessary to 
achieve any useful outcome.
13 . To debate whether debt service burden writedown should be global or case by case is - 
on the face o f it - a confusion:
a. the formula is (and the principles underlying it are) inherently global or at least 
poor and lower middle income country wide;
b. the actual appropriate debt service writedown proportions (or, in practice, range 
since all ten year projects give more plausible range than point outcomes) will vary 
because the contexts vary;
c. the modalities and sharing o f writedowns of necessity will be negotiated case by 
case (preferably in one or two fora) and then embodied in a substantial number of 
bilateral contracts. However if what is being said is that lenders wish to require 
detailed case by case conditions - whether economic, political or social - prior to
writedown, then the nature o f the debate is clear - as is probable opposition to a
formula approach to calculating appropriate writedown proportions. Whether 
removal o f debt overhang is a particularly sound Christmas tree to bedeck with 
semi-related conditionality baubles is problematic but evidently these would be 
case by case.
14. Therefore, the short answers to whether external debt service burden writedown to 
appropriate and efficient would appear to be:
a. in many cases - yes, yes;
b. with the proportion depending on what historic debt service continuation is 
compatible with sustainable future growth and development as well as meeting 
new external obligations;
c. using whatever writedown modalities and burden sharing^ are negotiable among 
creditors in specific cases so long as they add up to the targeted writedown;
d. and recognising that while writing off'dead' debt overhang is highly useful for 
predictability enhancing/expectations improving reasons, it should not be done out 
o f present 'live' concessional flows or one has subtractionality rather than 
additionality;
using a combination o f resource availability enhancement routes: debt service 
burden reduction and concessional finance plus - where appropriate - commercial 
lending is likely to be superior to one instrument approaches;
and recognising that failing to remove debt overhangs is a poor business decision 
and one quite unnecessary for exerting future leverage or averting future 
overborrowing.
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aNotes
1. The World Bank's de facto  policy of refinancing debt service on old Bank loans with 
new IDA credits for certain SSA borrowers is an example - and one in which the 
refinancing represents a substantial writedown as do substitution of ESAP for standard 
IMF drawings. Bilateral cases include Japan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
2. Country differences will arise from differences by category whenever proportions of 
bilateral official, officially insured and standard commercial lending vary among 
creditors.
3. Both Zimbabwe - certainly - and the Philippines - probably - are examples o f this 
category.
4. Indeed it is by no means evident that present writedowns o f such loans are universally
smaller or harder to achieve than for bilateral ones.
5. The plausible scenarios ending in a new debt overhang involve natural (e.g. drought), 
commercial (e.g. terms o f trade) or manmade (e.g. war) catastrophes not foreseen at 
the time o f the writedown. It is hard to see how not writing down would reduce the 
risk o f the first two at all or o f the third significantly.
6. This is primarily a lender issue - partly among different states and partly between state
and commercial lenders in each state as well as among states.
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